The devil’s advocate
By Zemenay Bahta

Let me try for once to be the devil’s advocate. To do so, I’ll put myself in Issayas’ shoes. But I will first say a few things about how different groups have reacted to the Pretoria agreement.

The fiercest opposition to the agreement comes from some Amhara groups who believe that Abiy does not have the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Amhara people. They believe or suspect that Abiy has agreed to return west and south Tigray to the Tigray region. Their suspicion is based on the reference in the agreement to the return of constitutional order in Tigray. For that reason, they think that the agreement should not and cannot be implemented. These groups are also furious that the TPLF, which they consider a terrorist group, has been allowed to enter Ethiopian politics.

Some Tigrians, particularly members of opposition parties, are unhappy about the agreement. Their criticism emanates mainly from the provision in the agreement that talks about disarmament. Some of them also believe that the agreement would make Tigray effectively under the federal government. Remember that so many in Tigray have given up hope of ever living with other Ethiopians and would love to have an independent Tigray.

The reaction in Oromia is that the agreement is a good start but cannot bring peace to the country unless there is a similar agreement with the OLA and other Oromo opposition parties. I also believe that there is a similar mood in other regions as well.

The fact that the Pretoria agreement has been met with suspicion and condemnation from some corners is natural. However, I tend to believe that most in Tigray would take the agreement with some reservations. What Tigray will get in return for the concessions it made far outweighs what it may lose. Of course, we will have to wait and see how the agreement is implemented on the ground and how robust the monitoring mechanism will be. Also, remember that the whole international community has commended the agreement and has expressed its readiness to help in making sure that it is implemented.

Now let me turn to Issayas. If Abiy, who invited Issayas to join him in his war against Tigray, has agreed to cease hostilities, what business would Issayas have in Tigray? Although the agreement does not expressly state that Eritrean forces must withdraw from Tigray, isn’t it implicit in the agreement that the guns will be silenced in Tigray? One can say that Issayas maybe does not care about what Abiy has agreed to, much less care about whatever the international community may do. Well, I don’t subscribe to such an assessment. First, don’t forget that, even though he is a dictator, his military decisions are rational. He is a very cunny and shrewd dictator who knows when to attack and retreat. Didn’t he withdraw his forces after Operation Allula last year? Now, he has a stronger reason to withdraw his forces. His ally has committed himself to stop the war and his forces are surrounded by a hostile population. For these reasons, it won’t be long before Issayas orders his troops out of Tigray. Mark my word.

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An agreement has been signed between the Abiy government and the "TPLF"

As expected, an agreement has been signed between the Abiy government and the "TPLF" to, among others, permanently cease hostilities, allow unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance, restore public services and rebuild infrastructure. It was also agreed that students will go to school, farmers and pastoralists to their fields, and public servants to their offices. Also, the parties have agreed that Ethiopia "has only one national defense force" and that the "parties have agreed on a detailed program of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration for the TPLF combatants." Last but not least, the parties have agreed to "implement transitional measures that include the restoration of the Constitutional order in the Tigray region." For what they are worth, these are the main provisions in the agreement.

Understandably, there have been mixed reactions about the agreement. On the one hand, there are those who think that the TPLF has made far more concessions than Abiy, specifically pointing to the provision regarding "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of TPLF combatants." On the other hand, there are those who are content that the guns will be silenced and that the lives of the people of Tigray will return to normalcy. The former are furious - understandably - that the agreement does not expressly mention the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from territories under occupation and withdrawal of Amhara forces from west and south Tigray.

Here is what I think about the agreement:

The good news first. It is a relief to the people of Tigray that hostilities will stop and humanitarian assistance will flow again without impediment; they have endured immeasurable suffering due this war, including massacres, rapes, looting, and starvation. Saving even one life that would have been lost senselessly is a good thing. The same with the restoration of basis services, such as electricity, phone, Internet, and banking services.

That being said, raising the issue of Eritrea and Amhara forces in Tigray is legitimate. The agreement is silent on what will happen to the Eritrean and Amhara forces in Tigray. However, I would argue that the issue has been addressed, albeit tacitly, by the agreement. I say so because it would not make sense to commit to cease hostilities while these forces continue fighting inside Tigray. Of course, the Tigray delegation has an explaining to do regarding this issue. Still, I would say that the withdrawal of Eritrean forces is incorporated in the agreement. This can be inferred from the overall spirit of the agreement - there can be no cessation of hostilities while Eritrean troops continue to occupy Tigray lands. I would say the same thing with respect to the Amhara forces. Note that the agreement talks about the restoration of the "Constitutional" order. Well, according to the Constitution, west and south Tigray are Tigray territories.

The other thorny issue is the "disarmament" of the "TPLF combatants" and the reference in the agreement that Ethiopia will have one national defense force. First, the provision is too broad and short on specifics. It is not clear what "one national defense force" means, especially when we know very well that the current Ethiopian national defense force has cleansed itself from any Tigrayan soldier. What will happen to the thousands of Tigrayan soldiers who are languishing in concentration camps? Does it mean that they will go back to their old jobs? Even if that were to happen, what kind of confidence-building measures are in place to heal the wound in those soldiers' psyche? Also, how can one be a member of the national defense force without representation of Tigray in any government body? Most importantly, what guarantee do Tigrayan combatants have, especially considering past experience, that Tigray will never be attacked again? By the way, the agreement also impliedly accepts that Tigray will have its own forces - just like the other regions - when it talks about restoring the constitutional order. It would be ridiculous to disarm Tigray while other regions are armed to the teeth. So, these are some of the questions I have regarding disarmament.

All in all, I think that the agreement appears to be the product of hard compromises that were made by both parties. Sure, there are a number of issues that need more clarification and elaboration. My main concern is the implementation and monitoring mechanism. I am hesitant to rely on the African Union alone to do the monitoring. But hey - you cannot get all you want in such negotiations.

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